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I. INTRODUCTION
As both the Interneti and the volume of its users continue to
grow,2 it is not surprising that legal problems associated with the
Internet also continue to develop in every area of the law. This article
explores a narrow issue that has serious First Amendment
implications: whether 'junk' e-mail (also called 'bulk' e-mail or
'spam') should be legally protected. First, this article defines junk e-
mail and attempts to explain why on-line computer services are trying
desperately to curtail it. Second, this article reviews recent cases that
have dealt specifically with junk e-mail in the First Amendment
context. Third, this article assesses whether junk e-mail may be
afforded protection under state common or federal statutory law.
II. WHAT IS JUNK E-MAiL?
As e-mail 3 becomes a popular alternative to traditional letter
writing, advertising companies, who ordinarily send bulk mail such as
catalogs, brochures, pamphlets and other forms of direct mail, are
frequently attempting to tap into this potentially massive audience by
sending unsolicited e-mail messages to hundreds of thousands of e-
mail users worldwide. From an advertising standpoint, one of the
more important benefits of e-mail advertising compared to traditional
forms (which advertising companies were quick to recognize) is that
it is virtually cost-free to the advertiser. Other than a basic service fee
paid to companies who distribute the e-mail ads, there is no per-
message charge. Additionally, advertising by e-mail is much faster
than traditional direct mail because the messages reach their
destinations within minutes. This type of direct on-line advertising is
known by various terms, including bulk e-mail, junk e-mail and
spam.4
'The Internet has been defined as "a decentralized, global communications medium that links
people, institutions, corporations and governments around the world." Cyberspace
Communications, Inc. v. Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737, 741 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (citing ACLU v.
Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
2 Recent estimates suggest that the Internet connects more than 159 countries and over 100
million users. See ACLU v. Johnson, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1031 (D.N.M. 1998).
3 Almost all Internet users are able to procure an e-mail address that allows them to
communicate with other users. See Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 165
(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
4 One court has defined spain as "unsolicited commercial bulk e-mail akin to 'junk mail' sent
through the postal mail." Am. Online v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 446 n.1 (E.D. Va.
1998).
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Recognizing the potential market for direct e-mail advertising
services, many companies now are founded for the sole purpose of
distributing the advertisements of various other commercial entities.
In fact, companies now sell software designed specifically to facilitate
sending junk e-mail.5 However, due to the vast amount of unsolicited
e-mail ads filling up Internet users' mailboxes, most e-mail users have
not been thrilled with this new development.
Many Internet e-mail customers now complain to their respective
Internet Service Providers (ISPs), such as America Online,
CompuServe and Prodigy. As a result, ISPs are forced to respond or
risk losing their subscribers. The usual, first response of ISPs is to
notify these junk advertisers that they are prohibited from using their
respective computer networks to send unsolicited e-mail. Predictably,
the advertisers rarely stop sending the e-mail. Because these notices
usually do not solve the problem, ISPs create software programs to
prevent dissemination of this junk e-mail.6  Undeterred, the
advertising companies seem to find ways to protect their messages
from the software by concealing their names and addresses. The
inability of ISPs to compromise with junk advertisers has spawned
multiple lawsuits, seeking both equitable remedies, to prevent
advertisers from sending junk email, and legal relief in the form of
monetary damages.
Because of a lack of immediate remedies, Internet users
themselves have begun to step up efforts to eliminate spamming
because it both interferes with their use of e-mail and violates the
rules of 'netiquette' (rules of etiquette in cyberspace). One web site
conducting a survey on opinions of junk e-mail reveals what one
might expect: the vast majority of people oppose spamming.7 Not
surprisingly, a search of the Internet reveals numerous sites lobbying
for a ban on junk e-mail8 and other sites offering to help users stop
unwanted junk e-mail.9 Despite such sites, however, the problem of
junk e-mail has yet to be fully resolved.
S See, ag., INTERMEDIA COMMUNICATIONS at http:J/www.intermedia.com; ROD'S
NETWORKING SERVICES at httpllwv.the-peoples.net (last visited on Apr. 11, 2001).
6 See, e.g., THE SPAM FILTER at http://vww.scot.demon.co.ukuspam-filter.html (last visited
on Apr. 11, 2001); SUPER MAIL at http://vww.supermail.com (last visited Apr. 11, 2001);
CATALOG.COM at http.//wvww.catalog.com (last visited Apr. 11, 2001).
7 See Survey.con, 1997 Junk E-mail Survey Results at httpJAWavv.su 'ey.comjunresults.html
(last visited Apr. 11, 2001).
8 Id
9 See eg., NOJUNKJHTML at http.//www.glr.comfnojunk.html (ast visited Apr. 11, 2001). If
you feel a need to voice your opinion on this issue, please contact your local Congressperson or
Internet service provider and let them know how you feel about spare.
2001] 33
234 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGYLAWJOURNAL [Vol.17
III. IS JUNK E-MAIL PROTECTED SPEECH?
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press."' 0  Junk advertisers often cite the First
Amendment as protecting the transmission of junk e-mail. However,
because the First Amendment applies only to laws enacted by
Congress, junk advertisers must first prove that an ISP's blocking of
junk e-mail somehow arises from government or state action and
therefore abridges the advertisers' First Amendment rights."I
In Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, Inc., (Cyber
Promotions 1),12 Cyber Promotions, a private on-line advertising
company, brought claims under state law and the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act 3 against America Online (AOL). The suit alleged that
AOL sent e-mail bombs14 to Cyber's service providers in response to
Cyber Promotions sending millions of junk e-mails to AOL
customers.' 5 This bombing allegedly resulted in the cancellation of
various contracts between Cyber and its service providers. Cyber
further alleged that AOL's private action constituted state action
because of the close nexus between AOL's action and the
government.'
6
The court rejected this argument because it failed to satisfy the
three tests outlined by the Supreme Court to determine when private
action may be considered government or state action.1 7  First, under
the exclusive public functions test, the court considers whether the
private entity (AOL) is exercising powers that are the exclusive
10 U.S. CONST. amend. L
1 See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995); see also Hudgens v.
Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. (NLRB), 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
12 Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1996) [hereinafter
Cyber Promotions 1].
'" 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) (1994) (stating that "whoever knowingly causes the transmission
of a program, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage
without authorization, to a protected computer.., shall be punished.").
14 An 'e-mail bomb' is one where the sender executes an automated script with a chain of source
routed messages that are delivered to a single server that usually results in the server being shut
down from the e-mail overload. See Tim Bass et al., E-Mail Bombs and Countermeasures:
Cyber Attacks on Availability and Brand Measures, IEEE NETWORKS Vol. 12 No. 2, 10,
Mar.-Apr. 1998, available at http'./silkroad.compapers/htmlibomb (last visited on Apr. 11,
2001).
15 Cyber Promotions I, 948 F. Supp. at 437.
16 Cf Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
17 Cyber Promotions 1, 948 F. Supp. at 441.
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prerogative of the government.18  Since the Internet is owned by
private entities, it fails the exclusive public functions test.
Second, under the acting in concert test, the court considers
whether "'the private entity has acted with the help of or in concert
with state officials." ' 19 Cyber argued that AOL was acting with the
help of the court (indicating government action) by seeking injunctive
relief in its counterclaim. The court quickly rejected this argument
based upon long-standing precedent that holds filing a lawsuit alone
does not transform private action into government action under color
of law. Thus, Cyber failed to satisfy the acting in concert test.
Finally, under the joint participant test, the court considers
whether the private entity and the government are in a position of
interdependence.20  Again, the court held that the doctrine did not
apply to the facts of Cyber Promotions . As a result, the court found
that the First Amendment was not implicated.
IV. CAN THE COMMON LAW PROTECT AGAINST SPAMMING?
ISPs have also looked to state common law to protect their rights
against spammers.2' One such case is CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber
Promotions, Inc. (Cyber Promotions II), another case involving Cyber
Promotions.22 In this case, CompuServe sued Cyber Promotions for
trespass to personal property. Cyber again relied upon the First
Amendment as its affirmative defense. In granting CompuServe's
motion for a preliminary injunction (which prevented Cyber from
sending junk e-mail during the pendency of the case), the court also
held that CompuServe stated a viable claim for trespass under Ohio
state law.23 The court relied upon Section 217(b) of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts to affirm CompuServe's trespass claim. Section
18 See Island Online, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc, 119 F. Supp. 2d 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
Island Online sued Network Solutions, Inc., a major domain name registrar, alleging violations
of free speech and due process after Network Solutions refused to register names that included
obscene words. The court granted Network Solutions's motion for summary judgment on the
grounds that registering domain names is a private, rather than a public, function. Id.
19 Cyber Promotions I, 948 F. Supp. at 441 (citing McKeesport Hosp. v. Accreditation Council
for Graduate Med. Educ., 24 F.3d 519, 524 (3d Cir. 1994)).
20 Cyber Promotions 1, 948 F. Supp. at 441. See also Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d
1137, 1142 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Krynicky v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 742 F.2d 94, 98 (3d Cir.
1984)).
21 See generally Mark D. Robins, Electronic Trespass: An Old Thcony In a Acnsi Contest, 15
Com PTERLAw 1 (1998).
22 CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997) [hereinafter
Cyber Promotions 11].
'Id. at 1017.
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217(b) states that a trespass may be committed by intentionally using
or intermeddling with another person's chattels (personal property).24
Intermeddling is defined as "intentionally bringing about a physical
contact with the chattel., 25 The court then relied upon cases from
other jurisdictions to support the proposition that "electronic signals
generated and sent by computer" are "sufficiently physically tangible
to support a trespass cause of action."26  The court found that
CompuServe alleged sufficient harm to its chattels to state a trespass
cause of action under Section 217 of the Restatement.
In identifying the harm to CompuServe from Cyber's actions, the
court observed, "many subscribers have terminated their accounts
specifically because of the unwanted receipt of bulk e-mail
messages. 27 In addition, the court noted that comment 'e' to Section
218 of the Restatement gives the property owner a "privilege to use
reasonable force to protect his possession. '28 In Cyber Promotions II,
Cyber's efforts to circumvent CompuServe's security measures by
concealing the true domain name and origin of the messages
prevented CompuServe from exercising this privilege.29
Cyber unsuccessfully argued, as it did unsuccessfully in Cyber
Promotions 1, that its actions were protected under the First
Amendment. In particular, Cyber argued that CompuServe assumed
the role of postmaster (for e-mail purposes) and should therefore be
subject to the strictures of the First Amendment-like a government-
run post office.30 Nevertheless, the court relied upon the decision in
Cyber Promotions I in finding that CompuServe was not a state actor.
More importantly, the court noted that there were still alternative
means of advertising; through traditional channels such as direct
United States mail and over the Internet through designated
commercial sites.
In America Online, Inc. v. IMS, AOL relied upon the same
common law trespass argument utilized in Cyber Promotions H
against another junk advertiser.31 Indeed, the court noted "the
CompuServe case is so strikingly similar to the current litigation and
14Id. at 1017.
2 id.
261d.
27Id. at 1023.
28 Cyber Promotions I, 962 F. Supp. at 1023.
29 Please check the links, supra note 6, for detailed information on the service providers' efforts
to eliminate junk e-mail.
30 Cyber Promotions 11, 962 F. Supp. at 1026.
31 Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 550 (E.D. Va. 1998) [hereinafter Am. Online i],
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the trespass law of Virginia is so close to that of Ohio, [therefore] we
will rely on the reasoning of Cyber Promotions [fl]. "32 Since each of
the common law elements 33 of trespass were met, the court granted
AOL's motion for summary judgment.34 Based on these cases, the
common law doctrine of trespass to chattels appears to be a potent
weapon for Internet service providers in their fight against spam.
V. CAN FEDERAL TRADEMARK LAW PROTECT AGAINST SPAMMING?
Recently, AOL has relied upon the Lanham Trademark Act3s in
its fight against spammers. 36 In America Online, Inc. i: LCGM, Inc.,
AOL alleged that the defendant spammers transmitted ninety-two
million unsolicited messages to AOL customers within a seven month
period.37 AOL sued for various claims of relief, including two claims
under the Lanham Act. First, AOL brought a false designation claim
against LCGM, arguing that LCGM falsely designated the origin of
the junk e-mails by incorporating the <aol.com> designation in its
e-mail headers.38 The court agreed with AOL, holding that the
LCGM's use of the <aol.com> designation in their headers would
likely cause AOL's customers to believe that AOL authorized these
unsolicited e-mails when it did not.
Second, AOL claimed that LCGM's actions diluted the
<aol.com> service mark in violation of the Lanham Act.39 As a
preliminary matter, the court found that AOL's service mark was
distinctive because it was well-recognized throughout the world.
40
32Id.
33 Vines v. Branch, 418 S.E.2d 890, 894 (Va. 1992) (finding that Virginia courts had recognized
a common law tort for trespass to chattels. "Where a person has illegally seized the personal
property of another and converted it to his owr use, the ovrier may bring an action in trespass..
.."). The court relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 217(b) to determine the elements
of the cause of action. Id.
34Am Online , 24 F. Supp 2d. at 550 (holding, as a matter of law, the defendant had
intentionally contacted AOL's computer network without AOL's authorization causing damage
to AOL's personal property).
35 15 U.S.C.A. § 1051-1125 (2001).
36 See Bruce Balestier, Queens Company Hit with Big Fine for E-Mail 'Spain.' N.Y.U., DMe.
14, 1999, at 1 (reporting that a federal magistrate judge granted AOL a default judgment and
permanent injunction against a spanmer who transmitted millions of unsolicited c-mails touting
apricot seeds as a cancer cure).
37 Am. Online, Inc. v LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 448 (E.D. Ca. 1998) [hereinafter
LCGM].
3 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1) (2001).
39See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1) (2001).
40 LCGM, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 450. A trademark must be at least "distinctive' in order to prevail
on a dilution claim. See Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497,506 (2nd
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The court then held that the AOL mark had been diluted by
association with LCGM's bulk e-mails,
Based upon the decision in LCGM, it appears that ISPs have
found another weapon in their fight against spam.41 Further, this is a
potentially powerful weapon because it will be much more difficult
for spammers to raise the First Amendment as a defense to trademark
infringement and dilution claims. It remains to be seen, however,
whether federal trademark laws will be readily available in every
situation in which junk e-mail is transmitted. For instance, if the
defendants in LCGM had transmitted their bulk e-mails without the
<aol.com> designation in the origination header, it is unlikely that
AOL could have brought the Lanham Act claims. As a result, the
common law trespass claims discussed above may be the ISPs' most
42consistent and effective tool in their fight against spam.
VI. WHO ARE THE SPAMMERS?
Today, many companies seeking to advertise their products or
services via e-mail engage the services of independent e-mailers, or
contract e-mailers. These contract e-mailers typically charge a fee
based on the number of e-mails transmitted or the number of
responses to such e-mails received by the customer company. Thus,
another remedy for ISPs is to hold the customer company liable for
actions of its agent e-mail contractor. For an ISP to hold the customer
company liable for the unsolicited bulk e-mails sent by contract e-
mailers, however, the ISP must show that contract e-mailers actions
were subject to the customer company's control.
In America Online, Inc. v. National Health Care Discount, Inc., 
43
this agency issue was addressed for the first time in the context of a
junk e-mail case. AOL brought suit against National Health Care
Discount (NHCD) for the transmission of millions of unsolicited
e-mails relating to NHCD's optical and dental service plans.44 The
Cir. 1996).
41 Other recent cases in which on-line service providers have successfully asserted trademark
claims against bulk e-mailers are Am. Online v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548 (E.D. Va. 1998) and
Hotmail Corp. v. Vans Money Pie, Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q. 1020 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
42 Evidence of the continued importance of state common law in the fight against junk c-mail Is
the fact that America Online asserted the same trespass theory in both LCGM and 1MS that was
successfully employed in the CompuServe case. See supra notes 12, 22, 31.
43 Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Discount, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (N.D. IA 2000)
[hereinafter NHCD].
" Id. at 1262 (accounting for NHCD's entry into agreements with dentists and eye cate
professionals to offer discounted services to the general public where members would pay a fee
to NCHD for access to these discounted services).
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record showed that over seventy-six million e-mails relating to
NHCD had been transmitted on AOL's network.45 The record also
revealed that NHCD was contacted by several contract e-mailers who
agreed to advertise on behalf of NCHD for a fee.
46
AOL alleged violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
the Virginia Computer Crimes Act and common law trespass to
chattels. In response to AOL's motion for summary judgment, the
court concluded that AOL would be entitled to summary judgment
only if AOL could prove that the contract e-mailer was an agent of
NHCD, thereby making NI-CD liable for the acts of the contract e-
mailer.47  Further, whether the contract e-mailers were agents of
NHCD was a genuine issue of material fact that precluded the court
from granting AOL's motion for summary judgment.48 Although
NI-CD asserted constitutional defenses in its answer, the court did not
address these issues in its opinion.49 Instead, the constitutional
defenses were preserved for trial.5°
NHCD appears to create a potential shield from liability for
companies seeking to advertise their products and services over the
Internet. If companies continue to employ contract e-mailers to
perform their on-line advertising, ISPs such as AOL may find it more
difficult to hold the companies directly liable.5' Of course, it will be
interesting to see whether other courts apply the reasoning in NHCD.
ISPs may need to decide whether it is strategically viable to attempt to
hold the companies directly liable or whether it makes more sense
simply to stop the contract e-mailers from sending the unsolicited e-
mail.
45 id.
46 I at 1262-63 (describing that NHCD agreed to pay the contract c-mailer S1.00 for each
'lead' obtained via e-mail advertising). A 'lead' is a response to an e-mail. Id.
47 Id. at 1267-71. Virginia agency law would govern because the court concluded that lowa
(forum) choice of law principles favored application of Virginia substantive law. According to
the court, Virginia is the most interested state because it is AOL's home state and AOL's servers
are located there. Id.4 1Id. at 1280.
49 NHCD, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 1280.
50
.1d
51 In the normal case, on-line service providers likely will develop enough facts to prove an
agency relationship. Although on-line service providers have the ability to shut down the
contract e-mailers, their real goal is to deter the individuals who employ these contract c-
mailers. One way to deter these companies is to hold them liable for the actions of contract e-
mailers. NHCD, however, appears to make that more difficult.
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VII. WILL FEDERAL LEGISLATION BE PASSED TO REGULATE
SPAMMING DIRECTLY?
On March 25, 1999, Senator Frank H. Murkowski (R-Alaska)
introduced Senate Bill 759,52 the Inbox Privacy Act of 1999 (1999
Act)53 that would specifically regulate the transmission of unsolicited
e-mail on the Internet.54 If passed by Congress, the 1999 Act would
expressly preempt state law, which likely includes state common law
remedies for trespass discussed above.55 The 1999 Act would also
give ISPs and their customers the option of whether they wished to
receive unsolicited e-mail. In particular, section two states that "[a]
person may not initiate the transmission of unsolicited commercial
electronic mail 56 to another person if such other person submits to the
person a request that the initiation of the transmission of such mail by
the person to such other person not occur."
57
The 1999 Act allows ISPs or interactive computer service
providers58 to bring a civil action for damages within one year of
discovery of the violation.59 Damages in this situation are capped at
$50,000 for each day that the violation continues.6
The 1999 Act also authorizes the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) to "prescribe rules for defining and prohibiting deceptive acts
or practices in connection with... the sale or services on or by means
of the Internet."' 61 Additionally, the 1999 Act gives the FTC power to
investigate alleged violations. 62  Nevertheless, there has been no
activity on this bill for the past year. As a result, it is difficult to tell
whether the bill will ever be passed.
52 Inbox Privacy Act of 1999, S. 759, 106th Cong. (1999).
13 Id. (stating that the purpose of the law is "[t]o regulate the transmission of unsolicited
commercial e-mail on the Interet, and for other purposes.").
m This bill was co-sponsored by Senators Robert G. Torricelli (D-N.J.), Conrad R. Bums (R-
Mont.), Harry Reid (D-Nev.), Richard J. Durbin (D-Ill.) and Olympia J. Snowe (R-Me).
55 See id. § 7 ( "This Act preempts any State or local laws regarding transmission or receipt of
commercial electronic e-mail.").
56 Id. § 8(1). ("[Commercial Electronic Mail] means any electronic mail or similar message
whose primary purpose is to initiate a commercial transaction, not including messages sent by
persons to others with whom they have a prior business relationship.").
57 Id. § 2(a)(2) (stating that the request "may take any form appropriate to notify a person who
initiates the transmission .,. of the request.").
58 Id. § 8(3). ("[Interactive Computer Service Provider means] a provider of an interactive
computer service (as that term is defined in § 230(e)(2) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47
U.S.C. § 230(e)(2)).").
59 Inbox Privacy Act of 1999, S. 759, 106th Cong. § 6(b)(1) (1999).
6MId. § 6(b)(2)(A).
61Id. § 3(a)(1).
62Id. § 4(a)(1).
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More recently in the House of Representatives, Representatives
Heather Wilson (R-N.M.) and Gene Green (D-Tex.) introduced
House Bill 3113, the Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail Act of
2000 (2000 Act).63  The 2000 Act was designed "to protect
individuals, families and Internet service providers from unsolicited
and unwanted electronic mail." 64  On July 18, 2000, the bill passed
by a vote of 427 to 1 in the House and is currently being considered
by the Senate.
The 2000 Act would impose a criminal penalty for sending
"unsolicited commercial electronic mail containingfraududent routing
information." 65 It also would require the sender of any unsolicited
commercial e-mail to include a valid return address to which the
recipient may send a reply indicating a desire not to receive any
additional e-mail.66 Further, the 2000 Act would require the sender to
provide a means by which the recipient may elect not to receive any
further e-mail from the sender.67 Not only would the 2000 Act protect
individuals, it also would give ISPs broad discretion to block what
they consider to be unlawful transmissions by immunizing them from
liability.
68
With respect to administering the 2000 Act, the FTC is given
broad authority to regulate compliance.69 If the FTC believes that
0 Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail Act of 2000, H.R. 3113, 106th Cong. (2000).
Interestingly, like the proposed Senate legislation, supra note 52, the Unsolicited Commercial
Electronic Mail Act of 2000 has received bipartisan support. On May24, 1999, Rep. Green had
introduced a similar bill, House Bill 1910, popularly called the "E-Mail User Protection Act."
E-Mail User Protection Act, H.R. 1910, 106th Cong. (1999). House Bill 1910 would prohibit
the sending of unsolicited bulk e-mail containing false sender information, a false return address
or other false and misleading information contained in the header of the e-mail designed to
conceal the sender's identity. Like the proposed Inbox Privacy Act of 1999, the E-Mail User
Protection Act would also prohibit the transmission of unsolicited mail if a recipient opts out of
future mailings. Further, House Bill 1910 makes it illegal to sell or distribute computer softare
designed to evade the provisions of the bill
6' Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail Act of 2000, H.R. 3113, 106th Cong. (2000).
' IL § 4 (emphasis added). This section also would amend 18 U.S.C. § 1030 by making it
unlawful to intentionally initiate:
the transmission of any unsolicited commercial electronic mail message to a
protected computer in the United States with knowledge that any domain name,
header information, date or time stamp, originating electronic mail address, or
other information identifying the initiator of the routing of such message, that is
contained in or accompanies such message, is false or inaccurate.
Id § 4(d).
66Ic § 5(a)(1).
67 d. § 5(a)(3)(B).
68 Id § 5(c)(1) (providing that ISPs cannot be held liable for damages so long as they act with
good faith belief that the blocked transmissions violate the 2000 Act).
'1 d § 6.
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violations have occurred, it must notify the alleged violators and
demand that they cease and desist from committing any further
violations. If the notice does not deter the violators, the FTC has the
authority to file a complaint against the alleged violators.71
More importantly, and for the purposes of this article, Section 6
of the 2000 Act expressly permits private causes of action" for both
injunctive73 and monetary74 relief. The monetary relief recoverable is
either the actual monetary loss or $500 for each violation, not to
exceed $50,000. 75 In the case of a willful violation, the court may
award damages three times the amount authorized under subsection
(1).76 Additionally, the 2000 Act allows a prevailing party to recover
costs and attorneys fees.77 This provision will likely promote the
filing of lawsuits.
Finally, state law addressing unsolicited e-mail is partially
preempted to the extent that the state law is inconsistent with the 2000
Act.7 8 The preemption is incomplete, however, because the 2000 Act
expressly states that it "shall not preempt any civil remedy under
State trespass or contract law . . . arising from the unauthorized
transmission of unsolicited commercial electronic mail messages. '7
No doubt recognizing the First Amendment concerns of
regulating commercial speech of this type, the House set forth its
70 Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail Act of 2000, H.R. 3113, 106th Cong. § 6(a)(1)-(2)
(2000).
71 Id. § 6(4)(A) (requiring the alleged violator to respond to the allegations in the complaint
within fifteen days).
72Id. § 6(b)(1).
"Id. § 6(b)(1)(A).
74Id. § 6(b)(1)(B).
71 Id. § 6(b)(1)(B)(i)-(ii).
76 Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail Act of 2000, H.R. 3113, 106th Cong. § 6(2) (2000).
71 Id. § 6(3).
78 Not surprisingly, Microsoft's home state, Washington, was one of the first states to pass antll.
spain legislation. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.190.010 (west 2000). Other states have also
passed legislation directly regulating the transmission of unsolicited e-mail. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-152.4(A)(7) (Michie 2000) (making it unlawful to "falsify or forge electronic e-mail
transmission information in connection with the transmission of unsolicited bulk electronic
mail"); ILL. ANN STAT. ch. 815, para. 511/10 (2000) (making it unlawful to "initiate an
unsolicited electronic mail advertisement... if it contains false or misleading information in the
subject line"); CAL. BUs. & PROF. CODE § 17538.4 (,Vest 2000) ("no person . . . shall
electronically mail.., unsolicited advertising material unless ... that person establishes a..
valid sender operated return e-mail address ... that the recipient ... may.. . e-mail to notify the
sender not to e-mail any further unsolicited documents.").
79 Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail Act of 2000, H.R. 3113, 106th Cong. § 6(b) (2000).
The fact that state trespass law is expressly mentioned supports the belief that Congress was
aware of the recent court decisions discussed, supra notes 22 and 31.
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findings and policy in Section (2)(a) of the 2000 Act. As a
preliminary matter, the House explicitly states that the "[t]here is a
right of free speech on the Internet."80 Additionally, the House notes
that "[t]he Internet has increasingly become a critical mode of global
communication and now presents unprecedented opportunities for the
development and growth of global commerce and an integrated world
economy." 81 The House also observed that "[u]nsolicited commercial
electronic mail can be an important mechanism through which
businesses advertise and attract customers in the on[-]line
environment." 82
On the other hand, the House also expressed the majority view
that junk e-mail imposes significant costs on individual recipients "for
the storage of such mail, or for time spent accessing, reviewing, and
discarding such mail, or for both. 8 3 Moreover, the House found that
junk e-mail "imposes significant monetary costs on Internet access
services .. . negatively affecting the quality of service provided to
customers of Internet access service." 84 Most importantly, Congress
acknowledged that junk e-mail "may invade the privacy of
,,85
recipients.
The purpose of the Congressional findings is to demonstrate that
the law is rationally related to an important government interest.
These findings also reflect an attempt by Congress to balance the free
speech rights of senders of unsolicited commercial e-mail against the
hardship such e-mails pose to individuals and ISPs. If the 2000 Act is
passed and subsequently challenged on First Amendment grounds, as
this article suggests, courts will likely look to the law's legislative
findings in evaluating its constitutionality. The question remains
whether the identified burdens on recipients and ISPs justify the
restrictions imposed on the commercial e-mailers. Since the burden
on recipients is largely limited to clicking 'delete,' the real burden is
the potential overload of system networks resulting in less efficient
access for customers.
f" d. § 2(a)(1).
"ld. § 2(a)(2).
'Id § 2(a)(3).
83Id. § 2(a)(4).
A' U C § 2 (a)((5).
85 Uniform Commercial Electronic mail Act of 2000, H.R. 3113, 106th Cong. § 2(a)(9) (20 00).
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VIII. WILL THE PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS WITHSTAND FIRST
AMENDMENT SCRUTINY?
If Congress passes one of the bills discussed above, the difficulty
of proving state action will be largely eliminated.8 6 The stage then
would be set for a serious First Amendment challenge to the
restrictions imposed on spammers. The Supreme Court has explicitly
held that commercial speech is afforded First Amendment protection
as was the case in Virginia State Bd. of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., where the fact that the speaker's motivation
was an economic one "hardly disqualifie[d] him from protection
under the First Amendment." 87 Further, the Court stated, "[i]t is clear
... that speech does not lose its First Amendment protection because
money is spent to project it, as in a paid advertisement of one form or
another.
88
The Court has never held, however, that commercial speech is
entitled to the same protections as other forms of speech. 89  In
Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Comm., the Court established a
four-prong test for evaluating commercial speech restrictions (the
Central Hudson Test).90 The first prong is whether the speech at issue
concerns lawful activity and is not misleading; unlawful and
misleading content is not protected under the First Amendment.
9
'
Because the proposed federal legislation regulates all unsolicited
commercial e-mail, it will likely capture at least some lawful and non-
misleading activity.92 The second prong is whether the asserted
governmental interest in regulating the speech is substantial.93 Given
the Court's deference to the legislature, this article assumes that the
Court will find the government's interest in regulating unsolicited
86 The prohibitions of the First Amendment extend to states and their political subdivisions
through the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses, See Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
87 Virginia State Bd. ofPharm. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761
(1976).
8' Id. at 761-62 (1976). Presumably, the language "one form or another" would extend to c.
mail.
89 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n., 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) ("We have not discarded the
'common sense' distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction. .. and other
varieties of speech.").
90 Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Comm., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
9'1 d. at 566.
92 Although some junk e-mail probably involves unlawful activity and may be deemed
misleading, this article presumes that a spammer challenging the legislation will be able to
satisfy the first part of the Central Hudson Test.
93 For this part, the findings and policy of the legislation discussed above will be critical.
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commercial e-mail to be substantial.
The third and fourth prongs of the test are more problematic for
the proposed legislation to satisfy.94 The third prong asks whether the
regulation directly advances the government interests asserted.9 The
fourth prong asks whether the regulation is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest.96  In other words, used together,
"[tihe last two steps of the Central Hudson analysis basically involve
a consideration of the 'fit' between the legislature's ends and the
means chosen to accomplish those ends."97 Further, the government's
burden "is not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture; rather a
governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial
speech must demonstrate that the harm it recites are real and that its
restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree."
98
Applying the last two Central Hudson prongs to the proposed
federal legislation, it is not clear whether the legislation will
withstand constitutional scrutiny. Arguably, the third prong will be
satisfied because the government's interest in protecting recipients
right to privacy is protected by giving them the option to elect not to
receive future e-mails from the sender. Additionally, assuming that
many recipients elect not to receive future e-mails from senders, the
volume of unsolicited commercial e-mails will be reduced, thus
advancing the government's interest in improving the quality of
service provided by Internet service providers.
The fourth prong is most troublesome because the legislation
must be "no more extensive than necessary" to protect the
government's interests.99 One can reasonably foresee an argument
from spammers that the proposed legislation is too restrictive because
it essentially prohibits them from advertising on-line once recipients
click a button and elect not to receive future e-mails. Since the
government cannot rely merely on the recitation of harms it seeks to
prevent,100 it will have to present evidence that the harms are real. 01
94 Cf Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 174 (1999)
(holding that prohibition on broadcasting lottery information could not be applied to
advertisements of lawful private casinos where such gambling %as legal).
9S Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 566.
96id
97 Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328,341 (1986).
93 Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1983).
99 The Central Hudson standard is considered intermediate scrutiny. Florida Bar %. Went For It,
Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995). See also Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 768 ("Unlike rational basis
review, the Central Hudson standard does not permit [the Court] to supplant the precise interests
put forward by the [government] with other suppositions.").
100 See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 489-91 (1995) (invalidating a law that
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Moreover, the junk advertisers would point out that if the legislature
were truly motivated by individual privacy concerns, one would
expect it to regulate other forms of unsolicited advertising such as
regular mail, facsimile and telephone advertising; means of
advertising media the government has not attempted to regulate.
As a result, any proposed legislation regulating unsolicited e-mail
will almost certainly be challenged on First Amendment grounds,
Courts will then evaluate the law under the Central Hudson test. The
key to any Central Hudson evaluation will be whether the
government's interests can be protected with less restrictive means.
IX. CONCLUSION
Based on the limited case law and proposed federal legislation
discussed, it appears that junk e-mail, or spam, will not be afforded
significant First Amendment protection. Indeed, courts appear
sympathetic to ISPs' fears that people will drop e-mail accounts if the
proliferation of mass spamming continues. 02 Nevertheless, it is not
clear whether appellate courts will follow the reasoning of the district
courts, given the fact that there is a whole line of case law in the
commercial speech area that affords limited protection to truthful
commercial advertisements. In addition, it is still unclear how much
First Amendment protection the Internet will receive.
10 3
As Congress and state legislatures continue to propose legislation
designed to curb spamming, it will not be long before legislation
dealing directly with junk e-mail is passed. Once the law is passed
and enforced, one can expect the junk e-mailers to bring a lawsuit
challenging the legislation on constitutional grounds. 104  Do not
prohibited the advertisement of alcohol content on beer labels where there were alternative and
less intrusive means of protecting the government's interest in preventing 'strength wars'
between beer manufacturers).
101 This evidence will likely consist of studies and surveys regarding the actual impact of such
anti-spain legislation on the quality of Internet service and the protection of individual privacy,
the main interests that the proposed legislation seeks to protect.
102 Courts likely will be even more sympathetic when the on-line service providers fight to
prevent spammers from sending pornographic-related junk e-mail. Am. Online v. LCOM, Inc.,
46 F. Supp. 2d 444,448 (E.D. Va. 1998).
103 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
1'4 For a review of current legislation and proposals visit these sites: JUNK E-MAIL CALL TO
ACTION at http:llwww.tigerden.com/junkmail (last visited April 22, 2001);
Center for Information Technology and Privacy Law, John Marshall Law School, Unsolicited E-
mail Statutes at http//www.jmls.edulcyber/statuteslemaillindex.html (last visited April 22, 2001)
and David E. Sorkin, Spain Laws at http'//wwv.spamlaws.com (last visited April 22, 2001).
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expect these recent defeats in the courts to deter spammerslos because
as we all know, one man's "junk" is another man's "gold."
105 Recently, one 'spammer' successfully challenged Vashington state's anti-sparn law as a
violation of the interstate commerce clause of the United States Constitution. In striking down
the law, the state trial judge found that it was "unduly restrictive and burdensome." The
decision is being appealed by the Washington Attorney General's office. Sce Peter Le vis, Anti-
Spam E-Mail Suit Tossed Out, SEATrLETI IES, Mar. 14,2000, at Al.
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